Civil Procedure -- Constitutionality of Constructive Service of Process on Missing Defendants by Brannon, Joan G.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 48 | Number 3 Article 11
4-1-1970
Civil Procedure -- Constitutionality of
Constructive Service of Process on Missing
Defendants
Joan G. Brannon
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joan G. Brannon, Civil Procedure -- Constitutionality of Constructive Service of Process on Missing Defendants, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 616 (1970).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol48/iss3/11
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
less, if Congress fails to act, it is not improbable that the Supreme Court
may intervene to provide the much-needed protection.
ODEs L. STROUPE, JR.
Civil Procedure-Constitutionality of Constructive Service of Process
on Missing Defendants
With the advent of far-reaching long-arm statutes1 allowing a basis
for in personam jurisdiction with only minimal contacts' in a state, courts
in the future will be faced increasingly with the problem of what manner
of service of process is to be allowed as a sufficient giving of notice to the
defendant. It is only logical that as the geographical-power concept of
jurisdiction diminishes and in personam jurisdiciton can be had over a
greater number of nonresidents,8 courts must give more attention and
primary concern to notice requirements.
The purpose of service of process is to give the defendant notice of
a suit pending against him so that he may come in and defend.4 But what
happens when the plaintiff has a basis for in personam jurisdiction and
the defendant cannot be found so that he can be served with process?
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-75.4 (1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. §262.05 (Supp.
1969). For a thorough discussion of these statutes, see Revision Notes to Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1969); Hinson, Jurisdiction Over Persons and Prop-
erty, in NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON JURIS-
DICTION, JOINDER AND PLEADING UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S NEW RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 1I-I (1968).
" There is extensive judicial development in the area of the minimal-contact
theory. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court JuTris-
diction, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241; von Mehren & Trautman, JTurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Developments in the
Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960).
In all the problematic situations dealt with in this note, it is assumed that the
applicable state long-arm statute has provided the plaintiff with a basis for in
personam jurisdiction. The only question for discussion is whether the plaintiff has
achieved satisfactory service upon the defendant.
'In early American law, jurisdiction and service of process were approached
as two aspects of the same thing. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
However, with the modern view of service as notice-giving, the two have become
separate questions. No longer is the manner of notice that is to be given clearly
defined by the type of jurisdiction acquired. No matter what type of jurisdiction is
acquired, plaintiff is required to give defendant the best notice possible. See
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchin-
son, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
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The most common situation in which the problem of the missing de-
fendant will arise is an automobile injury case. Plaintiff, a resident
of state A, is injured in an automobile accident occurring in state A. At
the scene of the accident, defendant, resident of state A or any other
state, gives plaintiff his address. However, when plaintiff later files suit
and attempts to serve defendant personally,5 he cannot be found. An
attempt is made to serve defendant by registered mail, but the letter is
returned. May plaintiff, consistent with the constitutional standards of
procedural due process, then serve defendant by publication and/or mailing
to his last known address ?' If there is no reason to believe that publica-
tion in a local newspaper or mailing a letter to defendant's last known
address will in fact come to defendant's attention, is such service con-
sonant with the present test for procedural due process-"notice reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections" ?
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to directly pass on
the question, dictum in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'
indicates that such service in some instances would be constitutional. For
"persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a prob-
ably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and
creates no constituional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights."
9
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals in Dobkin v. Chapman1
0
Most statutes dealing with service of process provide for a preferred order of
methods. Personal service is always the most desirable. Generally, the method
favored next is leaving the summons at defendant's residence with a person of
suitable age. Statutes then provide such alternatives as registered mail with
return receipt requested and ordinary mailing along with nailing a copy of the
summons to the door of defendant's residence. Certainly one, if not all, of these
methods should be attempted before resorting to constructive service. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d); N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAW § 308 (McKinney 1963); N.C.R.
Civ. P. 4(j).
I The new North Carolina service statute provides for such constructive service:
A party subject to service of process under this subsection (9) may be
served by publication whenever the party's address, whereabouts, dwelling
house or usual place of abode is unknown and cannot with due diligence
be ascertained, or there has been a diligent but unsuccessful attempt to
serve the party under either paragraph a [personal service] or under para-
graph b [registered mail] ....
N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j).
'Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
8339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id. at 317.
o 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
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squarely faced the issue of the validity of an in personam judgment on
a missing defendant when notice was given by constructive service.
Consolidating three different lower court cases'" then on appeal, the court
held that constructive service on a defendant who could not be found
is not violative of due process.
In the first' of these three cases, the plaintiff, a resident of New
York, was injured in an accident in New York. At the scene of the
accident, the defendant produced a license with a Pennsylvania address.
The plaintiff's attorney attempted to contact the defendant by ordinary
mail, but his letters were neither answered nor returned. An unsuccessful
attempt was made at personal service, and a registered letter containing
the summons and complaint was returned marked "Moved, Left No Ad-
dress." The court granted an ex parte order 1 permitting service by ordi-
nary mail to the address given at the scene of the accident. A motion in the
cause was thereafter filed by the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation 4 to vacate the ex parte order as being violative of the due
process clause. This attack was rejected by the lower court's holding that
service by ordinary mail in this instance was reasonably calculated to give
notice to the defendant.
In the second case, Sellars v. Raye,'5 both the plaintiff and defendant
were residents of New York. Again, the plaintiff could not effect service
of process in a preferred manner at the address given by the defendant.
The court ordered service upon the Secretary of State in addition to the
sending of a copy of the summons and complaint by registered mail, with-
" Dobkin v. Chapman, 46 Misc. 2d 260, 259 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1965),
aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 745, 269 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 490,
236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968); Sellars v. Raye, 45 Misc. 2d 859, 258
N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 757, 269 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Sup. Ct.
1966), aff'd sub norm. Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289
N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968); Keller v. Rappoport, 28 App. Div. 2d 560, 282 N.Y.S.2d
664 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd sub wm. Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236
N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
" Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
" The New York service-of-process statute allows plaintiff to come into court
and have the court direct the manner of service when it is impractical under the
preferred methods. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308 (McKinney 1963).
"The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation is a public liability
insurer. The corporation was set up by the New York Legislature to provide a
source of recovery for the plaintiff who is injured by an uninsured or unknown
motorist. The corporation's attorneys may enter an appearance in any suit in
which it might be held financially liable. N.Y. Ixs. LAW §§ 600-26 (McKinney
1963).
- 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
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out the filing of a return receipt, and the publication in the local newspaper
circulated in the vicinity of the defendant's last known residence.
In Keller v. Rappoport,1" the third case, the defendant was a resident
of New York at the time of the accident. Upon inquiry of the defendant's
insurer, the plaintiff was informed that the defendant had moved to
California. Attempted service by registered mail to California was re-
turned marked "Moved-left no address." The court issued an order
for service by mailing to defendant's last known New York address and
delivery of copies of the complaint to the insurance carrier.
The New York Court of Appeals, relying on the dictum in Mul-
lane, upheld service in all three cases and noted that "due process is
not . . . a mechanical formula or a rigid set of rules. Increasingly in
modern jurisprudence, the term has come to represent a realistic and
reasonable evaluation of the ... circumstances of the particular case."
17
Courts in the future faced with the problem of constructive service on
defendants whose actual whereabouts are unknown and unknowable by
any ordinary means must carefully evaluate and balance a series of factors
before determining whether constructive service meets the due process
standard. None of these factors are conclusive in themselves, but a reading
of the cases already decided by various state courts discloses the ones that
are usually of determinative importance in automobile-accident cases.
The remainder of this note will examine those factors.
I. PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST
The plaintiff's need for an opportunity to recover was recognized by
the United States Supreme Court when it observed that "the potentialities
of damage by a motorist, in a population as mobile as ours, are such
that those whom he injures must have opportunities of redress against
[the defendant] provided only that he is afforded an opportunity to defend
himself."' If the courts deny a chance for recovery in instances in which
the defendant cannot be personally served, many an injured plaintiff will
go without recompense, and the courts would, as a practical matter,
be rewarding the defendant who absented himself.
Recognizing that it is all too easy for a defendant to escape liability
by secreting himself, many states have enacted statutes providing for
service by publication when a resident defendant fraudulently conceals
'16Id.
Id. at 502, 236 N.E.2d at 457-58, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
180lberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
himself to avoid service of process.' However, under most of these
statutes, the plaintiff must prove fraudulent concealment. In Harrison v.
Hanvey,2 ° the North Carolina Supreme Court succinctly stated the prob-
lem:
If a defendant . . . successfully keeps himself concealed . . . , a
plaintiff with a good cause of action may be greatly disadvantaged and
the defendant will profit from his fraud unless the plaintiff can serve
him with process by publication. Of necessity, often no better notice
can be given. No . . .resident of a state should be allowed, by . * ,
concealment, to escape his legal obligations and thwart the efforts of
the courts of his state to enforce the rights of others against him.
21
A California district court of appeals22 recently upheld service by publica-
tion on an absent defendant without requiring proof by the plaintiff that
the defendant was fraudulently concealing himself to avoid process.
Noting that, as far as the plaintiff was concerned, it did not matter why
the defendant disappeared, the court held that the availability of relief
should not depend upon the motive of the defendant.2 3 "The careless as
well as the scoundrel owe equal responsibility to answer for their obliga-
tions.' '2
It might be argued that the plaintiff's interest would be protected
adequately by the tolling of the statute of limitations so that the plaintiff
would be allowed to file his complaint when he discovers the whereabouts
of the defendant. This remedy is certainly not an attractive one for
the plaintiff. It is quite likely that by the time he finds the defendant,
if he ever does, his claim will be difficult to prove because the necessary
witnesses may be unavailable, and even the available witnesses will have
the inevitable lapse of memory from the passage of time. If the defendant
"'E.g., CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE §§ 412, 413, 417 (West 1954); ch. 553, [1957]
N.C. Sess. L. 501 (repealed 1967). See Skala v. Brockman, 109 Neb. 259, 190
N.W. 860 (1922).
20265 N.C. 243, 143 S.E.2d 593 (1965).
2 Id. at 251, 143 S.E.2d at 599.
22 Craddock v. Financial Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
2 It is true that a defendant who is secreting himself is in a morally inferior
position to one who cannot be found after due diligence. It does not follow
that only the former is vulnerable to a personal judgment after published sum-
mons. Due process requires no more than "fair notice." Whatever his
reason, Cervantes has disappeared .... It it [sic] obvious that no notice
other than that which was given could have been given.
Td. at -, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 96-97.
2 Note, Service by Publication on a Defendant Who Cannot Be Located in
California, 3 U. SAN FRANCISco L. REv. 320, 326 (1969).
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cannot be found, even with a judgment the plaintiff may not be able
to collect immediately. But, at least, by having the opportunity to
secure an immediate judgment, plaintiff may be able to get at defendant's
assets, including insurance; and he can avoid the problems of delay in
having his claims heard. Clearly, granting the plaintiff an immediate right
to a judgment is a compelling reason for upholding constructive service.
II. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PROVIDING PLAINTIFF RELIEF
The second factor is closely related to the plaintiff's interest in re-
covery. Obviously the state wants to protect its citizens who are victims
of automobile accidents by providing them with an adequate remedy.
Not only does the state want to protect its citizens, but it also wants to
protect itself from having its citizens become a financial burden upon the
state. This dual interest was made apparent early in this century by the
passage of nonresident motor vehicle statutes.25 Such statutes allow the
resident plaintiff to secure in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant by the legal fiction of statutorily asserting that any nonresident
motorist using the state's highways is thereby consenting to in personam
jurisdiction over himself in an action arising out of any accident on those
highways. Most such statutes provide for service on an instate agent with
notice then being sent to the defendant by registered mail, return receipt
requested.2
The states' interest in providing automobile-accident victims with an
immediate and adequate remedy is also shown by laws requiring evidence
of an automobile owner's financial responsibility. Some states have even
set up agencies that provide a source of recovery for those injured by un-
insured or missing drivers.'
III. REASONABLENESS AND DILIGENCE OF EFFORTS TAKEN
BY THE PLAINTIFF To INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE SUIT
It is clear that, at the very least, the plaintiff must make a diligent at-
tempt to notify the defendant by the preferred methods of service before he
" For a comprehensive discussion of nonresident motor vehicle statutes, see Jox,
Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts: Notice Requirements-A Plea
for Realism, 33 F.R.D. 151 (1963).
2 Some states have held that good service is effected even if the signed receipt
is not returned. See, e.g., Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Va. 1947);
Williams v. Egan, 308 P.2d 273 (Okla. 1957); cf. Kelso v. Bush, 191 Ark. 1044,
89 S.W.2d 594 (1935) ; Sorenson v. Stowers, 251 Wis. 398, 29 N.W.2d 512 (1947).
See also 34 MicH. L. REv. 1227 (1936).
" See note 14 supra.
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undertakes publication and/or mailing to the last known address in order
for such constructive service to withstand constitutional attack. Service
of process statutes that permit constructive service generally require the
plaintiff to file an affidavit with the court showing that despite due
diligence the defendant cannot be found.28 It is, however, unclear just how
extensive an investigation to find the defendant will be required before
constructive service may be undertaken. In Mullane the Supreme Court
stated that "impracticable and extended searches are not required in the
name of due process.) 29 The Supreme Court probably will require greater
diligence to discover the whereabouts of the defendant in a tort suit than
was held essential on the facts of Mullane."
In Gribsby v. Wopschall,"1 the South Dakota Supreme Court, inter-
preting the phrase "due diligence," stated that it is incumbent upon
the plaintiff to ascertain if the defendant left any relatives, business asso-
ciates, or friends in the vicinity. If so, inquiry would have to be made of
them as to the defendant's whereabouts.82 Moreover, exercise of due
diligence ought to require that the plaintiff inquire as to defendant's
present address at the post office83 and from the Department of Motor
Vehicles.34 If the defendant's insurer is known, inquiry should be made
of it.3 5
The ultimate limit of due diligence that can be required of the plain-
tiff is that he hire a private investigator to make an extensive search for
the defendant. In two California cases38 such searches were undertaken
E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308 (McKinney 1963); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j).
' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1950).8 0The facts in Midlane are easily distinguished from the automobile-accident
case and would therefore seem to require a different approach. In Mudlane the
court was considering contingent and unknown beneficiaries of a common trust
fund. The court required notice by ordinary mail to those beneficiaries whose ad-
dresses were known. Significantly, in an action for the settlement of accounting of
a trust fund, the group of present beneficiaries will adequately represent the interests
of those beneficiaries who are absent.
25 S.D. 564, 127 N.W. 605 (1910). For a general discussion of due diligence
see Annot, 21 A.L.R.2d 929 (1952).
8 Grigsby v. Wopschall, 25 S.D. 564, 570, 127 N.W. 605, 607 (1910).
I31d.
Cf. Hayes v. Risk, 255 Cal. App. 2d 613, -, 64 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Ct. App.
1967); Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 497, 236 N.E.2d 451, 453, 454,
289 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164, 166 (1968).
" Cf. Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 497, 236 N.E.2d 451, 454, 289
N.Y.S.2d 161, 166 (1968).
" Hayes v. Risk, 255 Cal. App. 2d 613, 64 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1967) ; Crad-
duck v. Financial Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
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before defendants were served by publication. However, since the
hiring of a private detective would be such an expensive outlay for
the plaintiff, it does not seem desirable to make private investigations
essential to the validity of constructive service. To uphold such a require-
ment would be to greatly burden the impecunious plaintiff, perhaps to the
point of foreclosing his remedy of suit altogether.3
7
IV. THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHER SAFEGUARDS FOR THE
DEFENDANT'S INTERESTS
Although some courts have held that a judgment based on con-
structive service can stand without provision for allowing the absent
defendant to come in and have the judgment set aside at a later time,
88
it seems that procedural due process would require such a safeguard. It
must be remembered that in tort actions judgments against defendants
may run into the tens of thousands and even hundreds of thousands of
dollars. No interests of the plaintiff or the state compel the result that
a judgment may stand without provision for a previously unaware
defendant with a meritorious defense to have the judgment set aside
and the case re-opened for a contested trial on the merits within a certain
time limit. Some states have statutes that specifically provide this safe-
guard for the absent defendant."9
Such relief for defendants is also available under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. A motion for relief from a judgment may be brought
by the defendant under rule 60(b) (1)40 on the ground that he never
received actual notice.4 ' Generally rule 60(b) is construed liberally and
the courts are prone to resolve the controversy in favor of a trial on the
merits. Therefore, if the defendant can meet the requirements of rule
" Since the test is reasonableness of the plaintiff's search, perhaps the dollar-
value of the case and the plaintiff's resources should be factors in measuring how
much effort is required. As the value of the case rises, the courts might lean
toward requiring the plaintiff to hire a private detective.
" Cradduck v. Financial Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966). But see Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d
451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 317 (McKinney 1963) allows defendant to come in
within one year after learning of the judgment but in no event more than five years
after entry of the judgment.
4' FED. R. Civ. P. 60(h) (1) states: "[T]he court may relieve a party . . .
from a final judgment . . . for . . . (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect . . . ." Accord, N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1).
"See Ellington v. Milne, 14 F.R.D. 241 (E.D.N.C. 1953); Huntington Cab
Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 4 F.R.D. 496 (S.D. W. Va. 1945).
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60(b) (1) and also can show a meritorious defense, the likelihood that the
requested relief will be granted is great. There is, however, one serious
drawback to using rule 60(b) (1)-a motion under it must be brought
within one year after the judgment was entered.
In order to avoid the one-year limitation, there has been at least one
attempt42 to use rule 60(b) (6),"' under which a motion may be filed
within a reasonable time. This approach probably would not be very
satisfactory since federal courts have regarded rules 60(b) (1) and
60(b) (6) as mutually exclusive.44 Rule 60(b) provides for a more
reliable approach to avoid the one-year limitation; when equitable prin-
ciples warrant relief, the rule allows the defendant to bring an independent
action, as distinct from a motion for relief from a judgment, even if the
time for relief under 60(b) (1) has run. 5
V. OTHER FACTORS WEIGHING IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR
There are several other aspects of an automobile-injury case that
would make it easier for courts to uphold constructive service on the
defendant who cannot be located. Unlike many other actions, "in an
automobile case, no defendant need be without notice unless he chooses
and wants to be."'46 It is perfectly clear that one involved in such an
accident should be aware of the likelihood of a suit arising from it. Since
a suit should come as no surprise, it is reasonable for the courts to place
the responsibility on him to make and keep his presence known.
" See Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951).
"'FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) states: "[T]he court may relieve a party . . .
from a final judgment... for .. . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." Accord, N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). For a general
discussion of the rule, see Note, Federal Ride 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments,
61 YALE L.J. 76 (1952).
"E.g., Davis v. Wadsworth, 27 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1961). But see Klapprott
v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1949) (Black, J.) (although rules 60(b) (1)
and 60(b) (6) are normally exclusive, a motion permissible under 60(b) (6) if
more than excusable neglect is shown).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) states: "This rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment . .. .
Accord, N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b). See, e.g., West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George
E. Breece Lumber Co., 213 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954). There is another advantage
to the use of the independent action. Granting a rule 60(b) motion is in the
discretion of the trial judge, and, therefore, no appeal may be taken unless there
is an abuse of discretion. However, the independent action is a separate equity
action from which an appeal may be taken as of right.
" Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 504, 236 N.E.2d 451, 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d
161, 173 (1968).
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In almost all automobile-accident cases, the courts are dealing with
an insured interest. In those cases in which the defendant's insurer is
known to the plaintiff, notice should be given to the insurance company
so that it can come in and defend on behalf of the missing insured.1 If
the insurer is present,48 the absent defendant's interest should be adequately
protected. It is, of course, advantageous to the plaintiff to have the
insurer present because it will be liable up to the monetary limits of the
defendant's policy, and the plaintiff will have immediately available a
source of recovery for his injuries. 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Certainly the problem of the constitutionality of constructive service
on the missing defendant must be decided by the Supreme Court in the
near future. It is probable that, in balancing all of the factors involved,
the Court will hold that any time the defendant cannot be found after a
diligent effort on the part of the plaintiff, constructive service will be
sufficient to meet a due process challenge so long as there is a reasonable
time limit in which the defendant can set aside the judgment. In fact,
it is possible that if a private detective is hired and defendant's insurer
came in to defend, the Supreme Court might properly go so far as to
not require an opportunity for the judgment to be set aside. Under such
circumstances the Court might find that the defendant's interests were
,7Id. at 497, 236 N.E.2d at 454, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 166. A few states have direct-
action statutes that provide for direct suit against the insurer. E.g., LA. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1959). For an extremely interesting holding that the in-
surer's obligation to defend is an attachable debt allowing the complaint to be filed
wherever insurer is located, see Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312,
269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
"If the disappearance of the insured were found to be a violation of the
cooperation clause of the insurance policy, the insurer would have no duty to
defend. However, since the main purpose of the cooperation clause is to prevent
collusion between the injured and the insured, it seems apparent that in the situation
of the insured who has disappeared, the courts will not find non-cooperation. Public
policy would seem to indicate a decision in favor of the innocent plaintiff rather than
the innocent insurer; at least the insurer has received some payment for his duty
to defend. Cf. Lane v. Mutual Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 318, 128 S.E.2d 398 (1962);
Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960).
"'In North Carolina the law is unclear as to the liability of the insurer when
the insured has disappeared. There is some authority to indicate that when the
insured is not present, the insurer will only be liable up to the statutory minimum
insurance requirements rather than the policy limits. See Swain v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 127, 116 S.E.2d 482, 487-88 (1960). Cf. Muncie v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960). These two cases are based on an
interpretation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1965) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(f) (1965).
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adequately protected in the initial proceeding. 0 If every possible means
of reaching the defendant have been exhausted, it would be unreasonable
for the court not to sustain the validity of constructive service. If it
were impossible to get a valid personal judgment under these circum-
stances, "it would seem that the plaintiff would be unduly burdened and
the defendant pemitted the advantage of a windfall gained through his
own undesirable conduct." 5'
JOAN G. BRANNON
Civil Procedure-Finality of Determinations under
Federal Rule 23(c) (1)
On January 11, 1966, two indictments alleging a criminal conspiracy
to monopolize the low pressure pipe industry were returned in the federal
District Court for New Jersey.- The defendants pled nolo contendere
and were sentenced on April 29, 1966.2 On April 28, 1967, the City of
New York, alleging the identical conspiracy, brought an antitrust action
against some of the defendants in the New Jersey criminal action." New
York City filed the complaint as representative for a Federal Rule
23(b) (3)4 class alleged to include "all state and municipal governments,
government agencies, authorities and subdivisions in the United States."'
This action was begun within one year following the end of a federal crim-
inal antitrust prosecution during which the running of the statute of
limitations is suspended.' The defendants moved to strike allegations of
r' For a similar conclusion reached by a state court, see Cradduck v. Financial
Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). But,
of course, the insured is his own best witness, and therefore it can be forcefully
argued that his interests can never be adequately protected without his presence.
" Comment, Personal J1trisdiction Over Absent Natural Persons, 44 CAL. L.
REv. 737, 742 (1956).
'United States v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., Criminal No. 9-66
(D.N.J., Apr. 29, 1966); United States v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,
Criminal No. 10-66 (D.N.J., Apr. 29, 1966).
'See City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295,
296-97 (2d Cir. 1969).
'City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 67 Civil No. 1698
(S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 28, 1967).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
'City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 296
(2d Cir. 1969).
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15b, 16(b) (1964).
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